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PENELOPE ANDREWS

The South African Constitution
as a Mechanism for Redressing Poverty

USTICE Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
raised the following question in a lecture he gave at Harvard Law
School in 2000: 'What does it mean to live in a country with a wonderful constitution and an advanced comprehensive Bill of Rights, [when there
is] such inequality, injustice, and poverty?' (Sachs, 2000a).
The quotation came six years after South Africa's most prominent citizen,
President Nelson Mandela, set the tone for the first post-apartheid democratic
government in South Africa by announcing very early on his government's
commitment to improving the conditions of the majority of South Africa's population. In his Inaugural Address to a Joint Sitting of Parliament on 23 May
1994 he described the newly-elected government's commitment as· follows:

J

... to create a people-centered society of liberty binds us to the pursuit of the goals of
freedom from want, freedom from hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from
ignorance, freedom from suppression and freedom from fear. These freedoms are fundamental to the guarantee of human dignity. They will therefore constitute part of the
centerpiece of what this government will seek to achieve ... (Liebenberg, 200 I: 405)

This chapter will address the issue of the use of the Constitution as a vehicle to
address poverty in South Africa. The topic is propitious. The South African
Constitution's embrace of a broad array of civil, political, cultural, and socioeconomic rights sets it apart from most constitutional arrangements. 1 The
Constitutional Court has in the past few years confronted the issue of the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights, and has, in fact, begun to map out
some strategies. to give effect to the socio-economic rights listed in the Bill of
Rights (De Vos, 2001: 258). The Court's decisions, specifically the Grootboom 2
and Treatment Action Campaign 3 decisions which dealt with the rights to housing
and to health care, respectively, are in many ways landmark decisions, not just
under South Africa's constitutional paradigm, but also internationally. Although
the Indian Supreme Court has on occasion imposed duties on the Indian government to enforce socio-economic rights listed in the Indian Constitution,
most constitutions do not provide for the justiciability of socio-economic rights
(Tripathi, 1993). As the UN Economic and Social Council strives to develop a
methodology on the implementation of social and economic rights, the
Constitutional Court's decisions provide some useful pointers in this regard.
As many South Africans will attest to, and as many who have travelled to
South Africa are aware, the country generates all kinds of contradictions - and
in the process also stirs up contradictory emotions - of hope and despair, great
personal warmth and tremendous sadness.
Shortly after one arrives in Cape Town, one is struck by several observations.
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First, the miles and miles of informal settlements, until recently termed squatter camps. The second striking observation is the number of very expensive cars
on the roads. Since the prices of luxury cars in South Africa are so very steep,
the large numbers are really astounding. Closer to the city, one is struck by the
number of notices on houses which warn of armed response in the event of a
burglary.
These observations are not particularly novel, nor are they confined to South
Africa. Similar images confront observers in Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi.
Several historical, political, and economic factors have combined to produce a
particular political geography of devastatingly poor communities existing amidst
great wealth with a small buffer class in between (Sassen, 2002; Evans, 2002).
Justice Kriegler, in an interview conducted in the 1980s, referred to the legal
profession in South Africa at that time as 'an enclave of privilege in a sea of
misery'. These words, in many ways, apply to all sectors of South African society
today.
But despite obvious similarities with other developing countries, and some
would argue even in the developed world, South Africa is different. Fifteen years
ago the world was mesmerized as the tall dignified figure of Nelson Mandela
emerged from prison, where he had spent most of his adult life. The world continued to be transfixed as he shepherded the country to an agreement on the
most comprehensive . constitution of the late twentieth century, including a
detailed listing of rights (Friedman and Atkinson, 1994), and together with the
ANC steered the country towards its first ever democratic elections in 1994
(Sparks, 1995).
South Africa provides the most compelling case study for considering the
question of constitutional adjudication and review of social and economic rights.
The legacy of colonialism and apartheid has resulted in a dualized or hybrid
society both peculiar to South Africa, and also typical of many poor countries.
Those countries may not have been blighted by the scourge of racism, but the
ravages of other criteria utilized for dispossession, abuse, disenfranchisement,
and exploitation have rendered similar consequences. It is widely known that the
dualism or hybridity in South Africa has resulted in the heights of aflluence and
the depths of poverty sharing the national space - often amid huge tension. The
grand narrative of reconstruction is in many ways unfolding on a global stage
and at the center of the narrative is the core question of economic reconstruction (see Sachs, 2000b: 1381).
This chapter will address the following questions:
• What are the specific directives in the Constitution that provide for social and
economic rights and what methods are in place with respect to their enforcement?
• How has the Constitutional Court given effect to these rights?
• What are the structural and extra-constitutional impediments to redressing
poverty that the Constitution cannot address?
• What are the possibilities other than litigation for redressing poverty?
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Social and Economic Rights: Constitutional Provisions
Both liberty and equality are among the primary goals pursued by human beings
through many centuries; but total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs, total liberty
of the powerful, the gifted is not compatible with the rights to a decent existence of the
weak and the less gifted ... Equality may demand the restraint of the liberty of those
who wish to dominate; liberty ... may have to be curtailed in order to make room for
social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, ... to
allow justice or fairness to be exercised. (Berlin, 1990: 12-13)

The South African Constitution displays an appreciation of the tensions
between liberty and equality. Hence the listing of socio-economic rights is extensive. Included are environmental rights, the rights of access to land, housing,
health care services, food, water and social security rights. Also included are
rights to education and children's socio-economic rights.
What is particularly profound about social and economic rights in the
Constitution is that they are subject to judicial review and enforcement. This
makes the South African Constitution unique. Whereas most constitutions
provide for the justiciabilty of classic civil and political rights - the right to vote
or free speech - the South African Constitution rejects this bifurcated approach
to rights. What the framers of the Constitution recognized is that all rights are
interconnected and in fact depend on one another in mutually reinforcing ways
(Sachs, 2000b). So, for example, the argument that access to food and shelter is
more important than the right to vote rings hollow. As several CCY.o.nmentators
have pointed out and as demonstrated by the work of the Nobel laureate
Amartya Sen, the existence of democratic institutions plays an indispensable
part in the creation of access to life's basic necessities (Sen, 1999).
Subjecting socio-economic rights to judicial review and enforcement makes
litigation an important tool. The Bill of Rights has jettisoned the historically
stringent standing requirements in favor of more access to individuals and
groups. 4
Unsurprisingly, equality is at the core of the South African Bill of Rights. This
principle, of course, is set against a backdrop of institutionalized racism, sexism,
homophobia, and other forms of intolerance. The principle therefore is strongly
associated with the norm of non-discrimination. In this sense the South African
Constitution comports with global human rights developments since the passage
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - the international endeavor to
deal with the legacy of genocide, racial persecution and other egregious forms of
rights denial based on race, ethnicity, religion, and other markers of identity.
But the Constitution also references human dignity, and states specifically
'everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and
protected' (Section I 0). This adds a unique dimension to the rights endeavor
and in particular traditional notions of equality; it links equality to dignity. This
has been stated succinctly by Arthur Chaskalson, the Chief Justice of South
Africa:
There is also a close link between dignity and equality. No society can promise equality of goods or wealth. Nor could it reasonably be thought that this is what our
Constitution contemplates. It recognizes that at the basic level of basic needs such as
housing, health care, food, water and social security, profound inadequal:ies require
state intervention ... (Chaskalson, 2000: 202)
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This notion, the interlinking of equality and dignity, though fairly fluid, envisions not just individual freedoms in the classic~! sense, but also, in President
Mandela's words, freedom from want, hunger and deprivation.
These references to socio-economic rights in the Constitution make clear that
the state provides these rights 'within its available resources', and that they do
not confer an entitlement to 'claim the right on demand' (Sections 24-9). As far
as the rights of access to housing, health care, sufficient food and water, and
social security for those unable to support themselves and their dependants are
concerned, the state is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize
these rights immediately. 5 With respect to land reform, and particularly the
pressing question of access to land, the Constitution acknowledges 'the nation's
commitment to land reform, and to reform to bring about equitable access to all
South Africa's natural resources' (Section 25(4)(a)). The Constitution requires
the state to 'take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available
resources to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an
equitable basis' (Section 25 (5))
Here other points may be worth noting about the South African approach to
constitutionalism as compared with other models, particularly the American
one. The first is, obviously, the respective points of departure. The underlying
premise in South Africa is that South Africa is 'an unjust society in which
inequality is built in systematically and deeply into the universe of constitutional
adjudication' (Sachs, 2000a). In most constitutional democracies, and this is
obviously the case in the United States, the assumption is that society is
arranged fairly and that any derogation from the status quo has to be justified.
The reverse pertains in South Africa: 'any defence of the status quo has to be
justified, because the South African reality has been structured in a systematically unfair way'. 6
The second point worth noting is that the South African Constitution obliges
the government to provide a panoply of socio-economic rights. The
Constitution therefore embodies both the negative model of constitutional law,
that is, a proscription on state intrusion, as well as the positive listing of rights
(see Klare, 1998: 146).
This positive duty imposed on the government and the constitutional access
to the judiciary to enforce the rights create an identifiable role for the
Constitutional Court. The Court is required 'not just to protect the status quo
from undue unjustifiable intrusions by the state on people's rights, but it also has
to ensure that the rights promised in the Constitution are actually achieved'. 7
Another feature of the South African Constitution is the mandate to consider
international and foreign jurisprudence. A cursory perusal of American jurisprudence suggests that US courts are self-contained and self-referential. Ironically,
this mandate to consider international and foreign jurisprudence has not yielded
much for the Court in its adjudication of socio-economic rights. In South Africa,
to a large extent the script is being written at the outset by the Constitutional
Court judges themselves, with very little to draw from in comparative jurisprudence. 8 Although the UN Economic and Social Council has articulated a global
approach to the enforcement of socio-economic rights globally, it has done so
not as a court of law, instead relying on compliance by member states (UN
Economic and Social Council, 1987).
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Constitutional Court's Interpretation of Social and Economic Rights
Since its establishment in 1995 the Constitutional Court has carved out a
jurisprudence which clearly breaks from South Africa's ignominious legal past to
pursue a legal future forged on principles of dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. To illustrate this point, I shall discuss the two most significant and
recent cases of the Constitutional Court, which dealt respectively with the right
to housing and the right to health care. In both cases the court rulings demonstrate that socio-economic rights can bring meaningful relief to the poorest in
the country.
THE GROOTBOOM DECISION

In 2000 the Constitutional Court considered the enforcement of socio-economic rights provided for in the Constitution. 9 The case concerned an application for temporary shelter brought by a group of people, including a number of
children, who were without shelter following their brutal eviction from private
land on which they were squatting. The community lived in the most intolerable conditions; they had access to one tap and no sanitation facilities.
The Court considered the scope of the obligations imposed on the government to provide housing in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. Section 26
provides as follows:
(I) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.

(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
This case is widely regarded as an international test case of the enforceability
of social and economic rights. The Court affirmed that the government had a
duty to adopt reasonable policy, legislative, and budgetary measures to provide
relief for people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who
are living in intolerable conditions. The judgement also dealt in detail with the
implications of children's socio-economic rights enshrined in Section 28, which
provides, inter alia, for every child the right of nutrition and shelter. 10
It is worth noting that the Court order provided no individual relief to the
applicants, although the national government and the Western Cape government had agreed to provide them with various kinds of relief. It so happened
that both the national and Western Cape governments failed to honour these
agreements. Thus, several months later the Constitutional Court was forced to
order them to do so. 11
THE TREATMENT ACTION CASE

The Treatment Action case appeal to the Constitutional Court was directed at
reversing orders made in a high court against the government, addressing perceived shortcomings in the government's response to an aspect of the HIV/AIDS
challenge. The Constitutional Court found that the government had not reasonably addressed the need to reduce the risk of HIV-positive mothers transmitting the disease to their babies at birth. More specifically the finding was that

62

Penelope Andrews

the government had acted unreasonably in, first, refusing to make an antiretroviral drug called nevirapine available in the public health sector where the
attending doctor considered it medically indicated, and, second, not setting out
a timeframe for a national program to prevent mother-to-child transmission of
HIV.
The case started as an application to the High Court in Pretoria on 21 August
2001. The applicants were a number of associations and members of civil
society concerned with the treatment of people with HIV/AIDS and with the
prevention of new infections. The principal actor among them was the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). The respondents were the national
Minister of Health and the respective members of the executive councils
(MECs) responsible for health in all provinces except the Western Cape. 12 ,
The South African government, as part of an array of responses to the pandemic, had devised a program to deal with mother-to-child transmission of HIV
at birth and identified nevirapine as its drug of choice for this purpose. The
program imposed restrictions on the availability of nevirapine in the public
health sector. This was challenged by the applicants who contended that the
restrictions were unreasonable because the Constitution mandated 'the state
and all its organs to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.' 13
At issue was the public's right to access public health care services 14 and the
right of children to be afforded special protection. 15
The second issue for the Court to consider was whether the government was
constitutionally obliged to plan and implement an effective, comprehensive, and
progressive program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV
throughout the country. The Minister of Health attempted to demonstrate to
the Court the complexity of providing a comprehensive package of care throughout the country. The government's apparent reason for confining the provision
of nevirapine in the public sector to the research sites was to develop and
monitor the human and material resources nationwide for the delivery of a comprehensive package. This package consisted of testing, counselling, and dispensing nevirapine and follow-up services to pregnant women at public health
institutions. The rationale was that the targeted research and training sites
would provide important information, which would guide the government in
developing the very best possible prevention program for mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
The immediate issue requiring the Court's attention, however, was what to do
about those mothers and their babies who could not afford private health care
and who did not have access to the research and training sites.
In a comprehensive judgement, the Court found that the government had not
reasonably addressed the need to reduce the risk of HIV-positive mothers transmitting the disease to their babies at birth. More specifically, the finding was that
the government had acted unreasonably, first by refusing to make an antiretroviral drug called nevirapine available in the public health sector where the
attending doctor considered it medically indicated and, second, by not setting
out a timeframe for establishing a national program to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV. The Court ordered the government to do so.
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Structural and Extra-Constitutional Impediments to Redressing
Poverty
The 'rights revolution' in South Africa in many ways represents an important
yardstick in the chronology of human rights activism of the twentieth century.
The Constitution and its expansive Bill of Rights have arguably vindicated fifty
years of global human rights endeavors that followed the establishment of the
United Nations and the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and its progeny (Makau Wa Mutua, 2002). The South African
Constitution contains the most comprehensive listing of rights in any national
rights document. The drafters of the Bill of Rights were not coy about the aims
of the document - to generate a transformative agenda with human rights at the
core. The Constitution was designed to be a key instrument in moving the
country from being one steeped in minority privilege to one embracing rights for
all, and a symbol of the possibilities of human rights as a mode of political transformation (Liebenberg, 2001: 408-9). Sandra Liebenberg has noted thus:
The apartheid legacy of social and economic deprivation is a major structural source
of inequality in South African society. It also undermines human dignity and the
freedom to participate fully in the democratic institutions and processes. South Africa
has one of the worst records among comparable middle-income developing countries
in terms of social indicators (health, education, safe water, fertility) and income
inequality. Poverty in South Africa also has strong racial, gender, age and rural dimensions. (ibid.: 408)

The human rights project in South Africa is therefore extremely ambitious.
The Portuguese scholar, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, has commented on the
primacy of human rights as 'the language of progressive politics,' confidently
providing an 'emancipatory script' (de Sousa Santas, 1997) for those seeking
redress from unjust and abusive regimes, and increasingly for those who insist
that there exists a state duty to address economic inequalities. Upendra Baxi, the
Indian legal scholar and human rights activist, refers to the discourse of human
rights as 'seeking to supplant all other ethical languages' (Baxi, 1998). This
focus has to a large extent replaced the discourse of economic equity and redistribution. It is worth noting that this global project on rights has been analyzed
and subject to quite thoughtful critique by international legal scholars (see, for
example, Klug, 2000; Gathii, 2000).
The new constitutional dispensation, laudable and ambitious as it is as a
model of transformation, is significantly impeded by the broader context of
political transformation in South Africa. In other words, the economic legacy of
apartheid and its hierarchy has essentially been frozen in the post-apartheid era.
During the period of negotiations, which led to the drafting of the interim
Constitution and the first democratic elections, it was apparent that a wider
program of economic redistribution, an ideological staple of the African
National Congress, was no longer possible. The property and other economic
rights of whites had to be guaranteed in order to secure stability for the new government. In addition, the politics of economic redistribution had largely been
discredited by the end of the 1980s with the collapse of the Eastern European
governments and the widespread rejection of communism.
The African National Congress initially adopted a free market paradigm, but
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with considerable government input through the Reconstruction and
Development Program. However, this policy was jettisoned for the Growth,
Economic and Redistribution Program (GEAR), one more attractive and more
'market-friendly' to local and foreign investors. South Africans under GEAR are
made to believe that this global economic paradigm embracing free markets and
privatization is geared to accommodating the free flow of capital and to making
South Africa more attractive to foreign investors. But the cumulative consequences for workers and economically marginalized groups are quite deleterious.16
In a context in which respect for human rights has historically been an alien
tradition, as it was during the apartheid years, to be cavalier about the significance of the codification of rights may appear somewhat misguided. But the
formal edifice of law often obscures the underlying structural dimensions which
law cannot cure. For example, in the United States, where civil and political
rights enjoy constitutional primacy (now being sorely tested by the new war on
terrorism), the right to vote remains hollow. A huge proportion of the population, disproportionately people of color, have effectively disregarded the formal
electoral process, which is seen as having no relevance to their lives (Bell, 1990).
The challenge, therefore, is marrying substance and symbolism.

Extra-Legal Strategies for Reducing Poverty
While economic growth contributes to poverty reduction, it may not necessarily reduce
inequality. Further, there is evidence that countries starting off with significant
inequality experience lower growth rates than others because lack of access to physical, financial and human assets constrains poor people from participating effectively
and efficiently in the economy. 17

A vast body of literature continues to illustrate and analyze the structural patterns or practices that result in economically marginalized people being trapped
in a spiral of poverty (see, for example, Bhalla, 2002; Taylor, 2000). These patterns include the lack of access to education, health, and other resources that
create the possibility of basic subsistence and upward mobility. In addition, the
condition of poverty often precludes poor people from access to information
about pursuing legal and other rights, and information about credit and access
to government services, particularly social services. Another profound pattern is
the legacy of internalized inferiority, resulting in, for example, diminished expectations and aspirations.
Despite heated controversies about the structure, role, and consequences of
globalization, it is clear that globalization in the form of structural adjustment
programs and the primacy of the market has generated inequalities and poverty
on a global scale (Stiglitz, 2002; Friedman, 2000).
The post-apartheid democracy in South Africa emerged from a history of
extreme economic inequality, one of the highest in the world. Despite South
Africa's categorization in the UNDP's Human Development Report as a middleincome country, most South Africans can be classified as poor by all economic
indicators, and many straddle the fine line between subsistence and vulnerability to poverty. Rural poverty is particularly pronounced in South Africa, and
since the majority of residents in rural areas are women, poverty in South Africa
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has a particularly gendered flavour. 18 The challenge for South African democracy is therefore to reduce poverty by promoting opportunity, income and
wealth and, at the same time, reduce economic inequality.
When faced with this challenge of Sisyphean proportions, constitutional
imperatives appear somewhat ineffective. But the reality in South Africa is that
the embrace and enforcement of social and economic rights through the
Constitution are part of an overall package of transformation in the country.
South Africa, through the constitutionalizing of social and economic rights,
effectively chose a particular model of democracy unique not only just in the
African continent but also globally. This stands in stark contrast to the prevailing orthodoxy in Africa at the time of independence as demonstrated by the late
President Kwame Nkrumah's oft-cited aphorism: 'Seek ye first the political
kingdom and all else will follow.' 19 South Africans could benefit from the
lessons learned from the experience of successive forms of government adopted
in post-colonial Africa, almost all of which failed to improve the economic lot of
their citizenry. The lessons from these societies teach that the political kingdom
must be predicated on changing both the political and economic realities of the
citizenry.
In the absence of a redistributive economic paradigm, constitutionalizing
social and economic rights creates the possibilities for holding governments
accountable and imposing duties on them to provide for life's basic necessities.
The South African Constitutional Court has demonstrated its willingness to do
exactly that. 20 But as is the case with all rights enshrined in a constitution, their
enforcement is limited by the ability and willingness of civil society to pursue the
implementation of these rights and by the government's willingness to give effect
to the orders of the Constitutional Court.
South Africa boasts an energetic civil society as evidenced by the large number
of non-governmental organizations in the country. Arguably the innovation and
determination of the vast range ofNGOs contributed substantially to the demise
of apartheid. Many of the tactics utilized during the struggle against apartheid
are now being used by NGOs to pursue rights in this new constitutional era. The
national and provincial governments have inherited an enormous backlog of
economic needs and inequalities; they have an unenviable task in addressing
these needs and redressing the inequalities. Addressing these problems will
require fortitude, foresight, good planning, effective administration and a clear
commitment to success. Even with strong commitment and planning, ultimately
it is the organ of civil society that will ensure that the socio-economic rights in
the Constitution remain more than symbolic.

Notes
1

Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act I 08 of 1996 (hereinafter 'Constitution');
see also Dugard (I 996: 13).
2
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2000 (II)
BCLR 1169 (CC).
3
Minister of Health and others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) SA. 721
(CC).
4
Section 38 of the Constitution provides as follows: Anyone listed in this section has the
right to approach a competent court alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been
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infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are (a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest or its members.
5 The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of these rights. Ibid.
6 Ibid. Indeed the Constitutional Court has noted that equality is 'premised on a recognition that the ideal of equality will not be achieved if the consequences of those inequ;i.1ities and disparities caused by discriminatory laws and practices in the past are not
recognised and dealt with'. Pretoria City Council v. Walker (1998) 2 (SA) 363 (CC).
7 Albie Sachs, (2000a) The late Justice Ismail Mahomed set out clearly the transformative goals of the Constitution, and by implication the role of the Constitutional Court, in
giving effect to those rights. In S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) he noted:
In some countries the Constitution only formalises, in a legal instrument, a historical
consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable and unbroken
past to accommodate the needs of the future. The South African Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible and represents a decisive break
from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist,
authoritarian, insular and repressive, and a vigorous identification of and commitment
to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly
articulated in the Constitution ...
8 There has not been much litigation on socio-economic rights in constitutional democracies. India provides an exception. See Seth (1995, 97). The Court has also drawn from
the constitutional jurisprudence of Germany and Canada, particularly with respect to the
notion of dignity.
9 This was not the first time that the Court had to consider the interpretation of social
and economic rights in the Constitution. In 1998 the Court had occasion to consider the
issue of the right to health brought by a man who had suffered kidney failure and who
sought an order compelling the Kwa-Zulu Natal Health Department to provide him
access to expensive dialasyis treatment. The Court found against the applicant, stating
that it would be 'slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities'. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
10 Section 28 provides in part as follows: (1) Every child has the right a. to a name and a nationality from birth;
b. to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed
from the family environment;
c. to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;
d. to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;
e. to be protected from exploitative labour practices .....
11 When I visited South Africa in September 2002 I was informed by community activists
in Cape Town that many of the Grootboom applicants had still not obtained the relief
promised them by the Western Cape and national governments.
12 The Western Cape government had not been brought in as a party because it had in
place a program at public hospitals to distribute nevirapine to HIV-positive pregnant
women.
13 This duty is articulated in Sections 7 (2) and 8 (1) of the Constitution respectively:
7 (2): The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights;
8 (1): The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and all organs of state.
14 Section 27 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have access to
health care services, including reproductive health care, Section 27 (1) (a). Section 27 (2)
provides that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
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available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
15 Section 28 (1) states that every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services. See note 10 above.
16
For a detailed and passionate description of the negative impact of the post-apartheid
economic paradigm on marginalized groups, see Desai (2002).
17
'Poverty and Inequality in South Africa', Report Prepared for the Office of the
Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and
Inequality, 13 May 1998.
18
This situation reflects the patterns of rural poverty in much of the rest of Africa. See
Armstrong (I 987). What is different about South Africa has been the migrant labor
system which existed for several decades and which prohibited African women from
gainful employment in the cities, thereby cementing the unequal economic status of
African women. See Andrews (2001:326).
19
For a thoughtful exploration of the ideology espoused by Kwame Nkrumah, see
Williams (1984).
20 The Constitutional Court is not the only body empowered to enforce the rights outlined in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution empowers both the Human Rights
Commission and the Gender Commission to pursue the implementation of these rights.
Specifically Section 184 (3) provides as follows:
Each year, the South African Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs
of state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that they have
taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing,
health care, food, water, social security, education and the environment.
The obligation imposed on the Gender Commission is less specific, but the Constitution
states in Section 187 (2) that:
The Commission for Gender Equality has the power, as reguh1ted by national legislation, necessary to perform its functions, including the power to monitor, investigate,
research, educate, lobby, advise and report on issues concerning gender equality.

